Over the weekend, we had another story in the Gazette-Mail outlining some of the findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board’s report on the Freedom Industries chemical spill and the ensuing regional drinking water crisis.
That story made a brief mention of some comments from Andrew Whelton, the Purdue University engineer who led the Tomblin administratin’s WVTAP team, investigating the impacts of the spill:
Purdue University water system engineer Andrew Whelton led the WVTAP program for the Tomblin administration and was surprised at both the way the CSB selectively cited his work, and at the fact that the board’s report did not cite any of the numerous peer-reviewed publications about the spill that have been written by academic experts over the past two years. Many of those scientific papers warned of spill-related problems and dangers that government officials had insisted did not exist, and other papers clearly outlined gaps in how the nation’s drinking water system is protected from such incidents.
“Not citing work conducted by the multitude of universities that participated in the response and recovery seems deliberate,” Whelton said last week, after a preliminary review of the board report.
“I would be interested in the reasons why work conducted by academic institutions did not rise to the level of citation in such an investigation,” Whelton added. “Several organizations conducted testing to better understand the chemical properties and exposures. Others examined wastewater treatment plant processes and the fate of chemicals in the environment and wastewater systems.”
Since then, though, Andy Whelton has submitted a much more thorough examination of the CSB’s report, along with a demand that the agency “immediately retract your report and remove it from circulation until it is corrected.” Now, putting aside the problems with a government agency removing a public document — even a flawed one — from circulation — it’s well worth looking at some of the major points Andy Whelton makes here:
— CSB has claimed the 4-MCHM level entering the water treatment plant at 5pm on January 9 was 13.7 ppm. CSB provides absolutely no source for this information and this level was never made public by the State of West Virginia or WVAW. In fact, when I was part of WVTAP the state of West Virginia told us the data they jointly collected with WVAW was all that was available for 4-MCHM levels.
— At no point did CSB acknowledge that the CDC screening level did not consider inhalation exposure. This is highly disturbing and perpetuates a falsehood lacking scientific basis.
— How is the discovery by WVTAP that 4-MCHM was still present in resident homes one month after the spill not a major event on the timeline? This should be added.
— CSB has deliberately mislead the public with the following statement and this is shocking: “The yearlong study, completed in June 2016, evaluated the toxicity of MCHM and concluded that exposure at or below the MCHM Screening level of 1 ppm is not considered not likely to be associated with any adverse health effects.” While the CSB cites the National Toxicology Program final update posted online, CSB fails to point out that the NTP studies did not evaluate inhalation exposures. There is NO data for the long-term health impacts caused by inhalation exposures. National Toxicology Program admitted publicly their data do not apply to inhalation exposures. The omission of this information by CSB is disturbing and must be addressed in the revised CSB report.
— CSB does not indicate they reviewed drinking water customer complaint records from WVAW, yet makes the claim that “WVAW did not receive any complaints of licorice-smelling water from customers prior to becoming aware of the release…”
— CSB shall more clearly define what liquids were spilled, what they fully consisted of, what chemicals entered the water supply, were distributed to residents, and what research was conducted to identify and evaluate the fate and toxicity of these chemicals. CSB’s inconsistent approach in their report implies they do not understand what chemicals were spilled, where they went, what residents were exposed to, and what different agencies did based on requests from other agencies, among other deficiencies.
— Why wasn’t any of the plumbing system flushing guidance discussed? How is this not a critical aspect of the chemical exposures residents experienced? There was no scientific justification provided for this deliberate omission. In light of the disclosure by CSB that the highest MCHM level experienced was over 4 ppm, this makes the inhalation exposure a lot more significant.